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a b s t r a c t 
• Our work presents a unifying method to calculate the net-benefit of different preparedness policies against 
different pandemic influeunza strains. Unlike previous methods, which have focused on evaluating specific 
strategies against specific pandemics, our method allows assessment of mass immunisation strategies in 
presence and absence of antiviral drugs for a large range of pandemic influenza strain characteristics and 
programme features. Overall, the model described here combines two parts to evaluate different preparedness 
planning policies against pandemic influenza. 
• The first part is adaptation of an existing transmission model for seasonal influenza to include generalisation 
across large number of pandemic influenza scenarios. 
• The second part is development of a tailor-made health economic model devised in collaboration with 
colleagues at the UK Department of Health and Social Care. 
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Subject Area: • Mathematics 
More specific subject area: • Mathematical modelling and cost-benefit analysis 
Method name: Transmission model and cost-benefit analysis for pandemic influenza planning 
Name and reference of 
original method: 
1. Original model for influenza transmission was developed in: M Baguelin, S Flasche, A 
Camacho, N Demiris, E Miller, WJ Edmunds. Assessing optimal target populations for 
influenza vaccination programmes: an evidence synthesis and modelling study PLoS 
Med, 10 (2013), p. e1001527. 
2. Modelling tool that incorporates the model and introduces the “fluEvidenceSynthesis”
package applicable in R programming language was outlined in: 
van Leeuwen E, Klepac P, Thorrington D, Pebody R, Baguelin M. fluEvidenceSynthesis: An R 
package for evidence synthesis based analysis of epidemiological outbreaks. PLoS Comput 
Biol. 2017 Nov 20;13(11):e1005838. doi: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005838 . 
Resource availability: Repository containing the “fluEvidenceSynthesis” package described in reference 2 can be 
found at https://github.com/MJomaba/flu- evidence- synthesis 
Method details 
Impact model for control of pandemic influenza transmission 
The modelling framework used is age (i) and risk (j) group stratified deterministic and dynamic
transmission model that captures the temporal evolution of different cohorts within the population. 
d S i j 
dt 
= b N i j ( t ) − βc I i j S i j − μS i j (1) 
d E i j 
dt 
= βc I i j S i j − γ1 E i j − μE i j (2) 
d I i j 
dt 
= γ1 E i j − γ2 I i j − μI i j (3) 
d R i j 
dt 
= γ2 I i j − μR i j (4) 
Here S(t), E(t), I(t) and R(t) represent the cohorts of susceptible, pre-infectious (exposed), infectious 
and recovered individuals respectively at time t, b is per capita birth rate and μ is per capita mortality
rate, N(t) is the total population, β is the transmission probability, c is the number of social contacts,
γ 1 is the rate at which individuals become infectious, calculated as 1/(exposure period) and γ 2 is the
rate at which individuals recover from being infectious, calculated as 1/(infectious period). We note 
that the SEIR model presented here is a simplification of the SEEIIR model used within Public Health
England and presented in the references [1–3] . The model in [1] was initially developed, parametrised
and calibrated against historic cases of seasonal H1N1 influenza in England, and had the exposed
(E) and infected (I) groups stratified into two separate compartments. Additionally, separate vaccine 
components were also stratified by age and risk and calculated within the model. A subsequent
extension and an R-package that synthesises the model were published in 2017 [2] . The aim of this
package is to derive a readily available framework which can be adapted to explore the impact of a
range of vaccination options against seasonal influenza in England. The implementation of the model 
in R programming language has been recently made available in [3] . 
We collaborated with the authors to transfer this model for seasonal influenza to a model for
pandemic influenza. To do this we, firstly, simplified the original model by removing the stratification
of the population by age and risk group. Furthermore, in our adaptation, we only used one exposed
(E) and one infected (I) compartment and grouped all the vaccinated compartments into one group
and not stratified by age or risk groups. Then we removed the seasonality of the model and we
recalculated the mixing matrix by assuming an average number of contacts using the POLYMOD 














































ataset [4] rather than stratified by age and risk groups. We also adjusted the periods of exposure
latency period) and infection (infectious period) to be those reported for the UK: we assumed a
atency period of 2 days [5] and an infectious period of 4 days [6] . The parameters describing the size
f the UK population and the number of infected individuals at the time point considered to be the
start of the pandemic” within the model were fixed. 
Although previous work has used dynamic modelling to evaluate different immunisation strategies,
n the past they have been restricted to specific scenarios. Our method described here, instead, gives
 unifying approach that is translatable to different settings, cohorts and applicable to any pandemic
cenarios defined by their transmissibility (via R_0 changes) and or fatality (via CFR changes). 
To answer specific questions in our analysis, we adapted the model from [1] , to compute additional
ases brought by a possible second pandemic once the initial pandemic has petered out. To do so we
onstructed a “dummy” pandemic with a moderately low level of initial susceptible cohort (50%), a
oderately high basic reproduction number (R0) (2.2), a medium case fatality ratio (CFR) (0.2%). For
his “dummy” pandemic, we used the SEIR model to estimate the reduction in number of infections,
ospitalisations and deaths obtained from an “instant” (i.e. within one day) immunisation. We then
sed the obtained numbers as additional cases associated with this second pandemic weighted by the
robability of second pandemic that we treated as a dimension of our parameter space. 
We also extended the model to incorporate use of antiviral countermeasures in parallel to
mmunisation. We modelled antivirals as a binary option: “with” and “without” antivirals. In the
with” antivirals scenario we assumed that infectious period is reduced by 1 day, transmissibility is
educed by 14% and deaths are reduced by 50%. These are based on personal communication with the
ealth Protection Analytical Team within the UK Department of Health and based on work within [7] .
We note that within the model there is a balance equation between duration of infectious period
 γ 2 ), transmission probability ( β) and R_0 such that for a fixed R_0, if we decrease γ 2 , β needs to
ncrease hence increasing the number of infections. To overcome this balancing issue, we imposed a
ecrease in both γ 2 and β so that in presence of antivirals we end up with lower effective R_0. 
The model outputted the estimated number of susceptible, exposed, infected and recovered
ndividuals each day for a year following the start of a pandemic. From these the daily number
f influenza-like illnesses (ILIs) were calculated and then the number of clinical cases, the number
f hospitalisations and the number of deaths associated with ILIs were calculated. We note that
he multipliers for transferring ILIs to clinical cases and hospitalisations were derived from existing
iterature, whereas the multiplier transferring ILIs to deaths was the CFR which was treated as a
imension in our parameter space. 
When we considered different preparedness policies we projected the following quantities from
he transmission model: 
A cases = avoided clinical cases from a given intervention (compared to “no intervention”) 
A hosp = avoided hospitalisations from a given intervention (compared to “no intervention”) 
A deaths = avoided deaths from a given intervention (compared to “no intervention”) 
conomic model for mass immunisation against pandemic influenza 
We compared different policies P in different scenarios based on associated economic net benefit
s well as utility (QALY) gain/loss. To compute these measures we developed two economic models in
ollaboration with colleagues at the UK Department of Health. 
A “pre-purchase vaccine” economic model. This model assumes that vaccines are pre-purchased
and stockpiled in advance of a possible pandemic. Stocks are replenished based on vaccine shelf-life.
We considered three possible values of vaccine shelf-life {1, 2, 5} years. 
A “responsive purchase” economic model . We assessed the possibility of buying the needed
vaccines after the start of a pandemic under the assumption that technological improvements allow
a strain-specific vaccine to be manufactured in due time after a pandemic onset. 







For calculations of benefit components we need to first define Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALY).
A QALY is a measure of state of health of a person and corresponds to 1 year of life in perfect health
[10] . In our economic model, we valued one QALY to have monetised value of £60,0 0 0 in agreement
with recent impact assessment documents by the UK Government (e.g. [11] )”. 
Let us define the following quantities: 
q mon = monetised value of a QALY 
q l cases = number of QALY loss associated with a clinical case 
q l hosp = number of QALY loss associated with a hospitalisation 
q l deaths = number of QALY loss associated with a death 
c cases = NHS monetary cost associated with a clinical case 
c hosp = NHS monetary cost associated with a hospitalisation 
b abs = economic cost for absenteeism due to a clinical case 
We can then compute the benefit components associated with policy P by combining transmission 
model outputs’ A cases , A hosp and A deaths with these quantities: 
Benefit component (£) Formula 
QALY gain from avoided clinical cases Q cases = q l cases · ·q mon · A cases 
QALY gain from avoided hospitalisations Q hosp = q l hosp · q mon · A hosp 
QALY gain from avoided deaths Q deaths = q l deaths · q mon · A deaths 
Benefit from avoided absenteeism B abs = b abs · A cases 
NHS savings from clinical cases S cases = c cases · A cases 
NHS savings from hospitalisations S hosp = c hosp · A hosp 
All of these benefit components are assumed to occur only in pandemic years, and their definition
is valid for both the pre-purchase and the responsive-purchase model versions. 
Cost components 
Let us define the following quantities: 
c v acc = cost of buying a dose of vaccine 
c admin = cost of administering a dose of vaccine 
c stor = cost of storing a dose of vaccine 
c distr = cost of distributing a dose of vaccine 
c disp = cost of disposing of a dose of vaccine 
d = doses of vaccines required per vaccinated person ( 2 ) 
w = cover for wastage (10% of bought doses) 
sl = vaccine shelf-life (in years) 
Pre-purchase of a pandemic vaccine 
The following cost components are associated with policy P in case of pre-purchase strategy. 
Cost component (£), pre-purchase model Formula 
Vaccine purchase costs (every sl years) C v acc = c v acc · d · ( 1 + w ) · N
Cost of administering vaccine (only in pandemic years) C admin = c admin · d · N
Cost of storing the vaccine (every year) C stor = c stor · d · ( 1 + w ) · N
Cost of distributing the vaccine (only in pandemic years) C distr = c distr · d · ( 1 + w ) · N
Cost of disposing of the vaccine (every sl years, only in case there is no pandemic) C disp = c disp · d · ( 1 + w ) · N
Responsive purchase of a pandemic vaccine 
The following cost components are associated with policy P in case of responsive purchase strategy.
Cost component (£), responsive purchase model Formula 
Vaccine purchase costs (only in pandemic years) C v acc = c v acc · d · ( 1 + w ) · N
Option cost (every year) C option = F 
Cost of administering vaccine (only in pandemic years) C admin = c admin · d · N
Cost of distributing the vaccine (only in pandemic years) C distr = c distr · d · ( 1 + w ) · N





































where F = option cost incurred to “reserve vaccine order”
Please note that cost of storage and disposal are absent in the responsive purchase model as
accines are assumed to be bought as needed. However, an option cost is incurred every year to
eserve the vaccine order. 
omputing present values of economic net benefit and of QALY gain 
In agreement with Health Protection Analytical Team’s analysis at the UK Department of Health
nd Social Care, we used discount rates of 3.5% for monetary costs (including NHS cost savings) and
.5% for health benefits (i.e. QALY gain) to determine present values, with a time horizon of 10 years.
et benefit 
Let us assume that: 
p is the annual chance of a pandemic actually happening. We think of this as the probability of a
pandemic happening per year, based on the occurrence of past ones. The value used was agreed
with our colleagues at DH & SC. 
m is a multiplier for NHS costs to account for foregone opportunity costs. In agreement with our
colleagues at DH, it was assumed that every £1 spent on NHS resources generates a benefit of
£m. Therefore, to divert NHS resources away from their current use onto a PPV programme, we
considered the opportunity costs foregone, which translates into multiplying any costs or costs
savings falling on the NHS by m”. 
In order to compute present values of the components listed in the previous sections: 
all cost components as well as S cases and S hosp are multiplied by m ; 
all components only incurred in pandemic years are multiplied by p and assumed to be incurred
every year; 
all components only incurred in non-pandemic years are multiplied by ( 1 − p ) and assumed to be
incurred every year; 
C vacc and C disp are assumed to be incurred every sl years. 
Total costs are subtracted from total benefit (and discounted) to determine the net benefit
ssociated with either a pre-purchase or responsive purchase vaccine strategy. Let us denote the
iscounted components with “prime” symbol (e.g. C ′ v acc , Q ′ cases , etc.). Then: 
Net benefit for pre-purchase model N B pre = [ Q ′ cases + Q ′ hosp + Q ′ deaths + B ′ abs + S ′ cases + S ′ hosp ] 
− [ C ′ v acc + C ′ admin + C ′ stor + C ′ distr + C ′ disp ] 
Net benefit for responsive purchase model N B resp = [ Q ′ cases + Q ′ hosp + Q ′ deaths + B ′ abs + S ′ cases + S ′ hosp ] 
− [ C ′ v acc + C ′ option + C ′ admin + C ′ distr ] 
ALY gain. The total QALY gain associated with a given policy is then calculated by simply extracting
 
′ 
cases + Q ′ hosp + Q ′ deaths 
From NB pre and NB resp 
ffordability of policy 
Here we define our approach to establish whether a given policy is affordable. We assumed that
he affordability of a policy is determined by assessing the upfront costs to buy and maintain a vaccine
tockpile against a given threshold th AFF . 
re-purchase of pandemic strategy. For a pre-purchase vaccine strategy, we considered the following
non-discounted) upfront cost components to assess the affordability of a policy: 
In case of a pandemic year: G pand = C v acc + C admin + C stor + C distr 
In case of a non-pandemic year: G = C + C + C non −pand v acc stor disp 
















Responsive-purchase strategy. For a responsive-purchase strategy, we considered the following (non- 
discounted) upfront cost components to assess the affordability of a policy: 
In case of a pandemic year: G non −pand = C option 
In case of a non-pandemic year: G non −pand = C option 
Note: for the responsive-purchase strategy, upfront costs are the same in pandemic and non- 




G pand , G non −pand 
}
≤ t h AF F 
i.e. for every year in the time horizon, the costs associated with the policy do not exceed the given
threshold. 
Overall projections 
For different preparedness policies, we calculated the net-benefits for the pre-purchase model and 
the responsive purchase model (respectively NB pre and NB resp ). We then checked if the policy was
affordable. Our method can be used to simulate different preparedness policies and project the net
benefit. Examples of the applicability of the methodology described can be found in work by our
group published elsewhere [8] and [9] . 
Supplementary material and/or additional information 
This work showcases a method to calculate the net-benefit of different preparedness planning 
policies for pandemic influenza. Unlike previous methods which have focused on evaluating specific 
strategies against specific pandemics, our method gives a unifying approach that allows assessment 
of a large portfolio of scenarios and pandemic influenza strains. Overall, we have adapted an existing
transmission model for seasonal influenza and combined it with a corresponding economic model, 
which we devised in collaboration with colleagues at the UK Department of Health and Social Care.
Combining these, we can generate a large number of combinations of influenza and policy scenarios. 
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